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INTRODUCTION
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therefore constitutes taxable income under the Internal Revenue Code.
However, for the period of January 1, 2007, through December 31,
3
2012, Congress has enacted legislation in the Mortgage Forgiveness
their skilled editorial review and assistance.
1
See Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Daniel Simmons, A Field Guide to Cancellation of
Debt Income, 63 TAX LAW 415, 417 (2010) (“If the loan transaction is viewed as a whole,
when a borrower receives money in a loan transaction and is later discharged from the
liability without repaying the debt, the borrower has realized an accession to wealth.
Recognizing the existence of income in this situation generally is not a problem for the
income tax system. The receipt of the proceeds of a loan is not income because the receipt is
offset by an obligation to repay the borrowed amount. If the obligation to repay the
borrowed amount is eliminated or reduced without the concomitant repayment, the borrower
realizes an accession to wealth that, as a matter of tax theory, should be included in gross
income.”); See also United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3, 5 (1931) (A
corporation sold its own bonds in 1923 for $12,126,800, equal to their par value. Later that
same year, the corporation repurchased the bonds below par, at a discount of approximately
$137,521. The court ruled that “. . . the taxpayer made a clear gain. As a result of its
dealings it made available $ 137,521.30 assets previously offset by the obligation of bonds
now extinct. We see nothing to be gained by the discussion of judicial definitions. The
defendant in error has realized within the year an accession to income . . ..”); See also James
L. Musselman, Is Income from Discharge of Indebtedness Really Income at All? A Proposal
for a More Reasoned Analysis, 34 U. MEM. L. REV. 607, 633-634 (2004) (“When
determining the value received from the discharge of indebtedness, it is necessary to
evaluate the transaction that initially created the indebtedness since any value the taxpayer
received from a discharge of indebtedness would have been received at that time. Notably,
the value received by the taxpayer at the time of the transaction initially creating the
indebtedness would not have been included in the taxpayer’s gross income at that time
because the receipt of such value coincided with the creation of the indebtedness by the
taxpayer, thus resulting in no accession to the taxpayer’s wealth. In most cases,
determination of the value received by the taxpayer in a transaction creating an indebtedness
is simple. If a taxpayer borrows $ 10,000 from a bank in cash, and the debt is subsequently
discharged by the bank, the taxpayer would clearly have $ 10,000 of gross income from
discharge of indebtedness. No one would argue with the conclusion that the taxpayer
received $ 10,000 of value when he borrowed that amount from the bank because he
received $ 10,000 in cash.”) See generally Jay A. Nathanson, Tax Issues in Workouts and
Foreclosures, 65 J. MO. B. 240, 240-241 (2009) (explaining that unless otherwise expressly
excluded, income from cancellation or discharge of indebtedness is generally to be included
in gross income as an accession to wealth).
2
See 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(12) (2010) (“[G]ross income means all income from whatever
source derived, including (but not limited to) . . . (12) Income from discharge of
indebtedness . . . .”); See also Lawrence Zelenak, Cancellation-of-Indebtedness Income and
Transactional Accounting, 29 VA. TAX REV. 277, 313-315 (2009) (explaining that there is a
philosophical distinction between a forgiven loan where the taxpayer receives an actual
economic gain versus a “no benefit debt” such as a forgiven tort judgment where the tort
debtor never benefitted from a tangible economic benefit by incurring the original tort debt).
3
The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 initially allowed the tax free
discharge of debt from January 1, 2007 through December 31, 2009. See H.R. Res. 3648,
110th Cong. §§ 2(a), 2(d) (2007) (enacted). The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of
2008 extended the deadline from December 31, 2009 to December 31, 2012. See H.R. Res.
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4

Debt Relief Act of 2007 (hereinafter “MoFoDRA”) which exempts
5
forgiven loan debt on a principal residence from taxation. From 2007
through 2012, MoFoDRA allows individuals to completely escape
6
taxation on unpaid loan debt used to speculate on residential real estate.
1424, 110th Cong. § 303 (2008) (enacted). See 26 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1)(E) (2010).
4
H.R. Res. 3648, 110th Cong. (2007) (enacted); See also 26 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1)(E)
(“Gross income does not include any amount which . . . would be includible in gross income
by reason of the discharge (in whole or in part) of indebtedness of the taxpayer if . . . the
indebtedness discharged is qualified principal residence indebtedness which is discharged
before January 1, 2013.”).
5
Vacation homes and rental properties are excluded from coverage. See 26 U.S.C. §
108(h)(5) (2010) (“(5) Principal residence. For purposes of this subsection, the term
“principal residence” has the same meaning as when used in section 121.”). The
legislation’s reference to section 121 (26 U.S.C. § 121) is a bit misleading because section
121 nowhere defines “principal residence.” Instead, one must look to the Internal Revenue
Service regulations for guidance. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.121-1(b)(1) (2010) (“Whether property
is used by the taxpayer as the taxpayer’s residence depends upon all the facts and
circumstances.”); See also 26 C.F.R. § 1.121-1(b)(2) (2010) (“In the case of a taxpayer
using more than one property as a residence, whether property is used by the taxpayer as the
taxpayer’s principal residence depends upon all the facts and circumstances. If a taxpayer
alternates between 2 properties, using each as a residence for successive periods of time, the
property that the taxpayer uses a majority of the time during the year ordinarily will be
considered the taxpayer’s principal residence. In addition to the taxpayer’s use of the
property, relevant factors in determining a taxpayer’s principal residence, include, but are
not limited to (i) The taxpayer’s place of employment; (ii) The principal place of abode of
the taxpayer’s family members; (iii) The address listed on the taxpayer’s federal and state
tax returns, driver’s license, automobile registration, and voter registration card; (iv) The
taxpayer’s mailing address for bills and correspondence; (v) The location of the taxpayer’s
banks; and (vi) The location of religious organizations and recreational clubs with which the
taxpayer is affiliated.”).
6
See 26 U.S.C. § 108(h)(2) (2010) (placing a cap of $2,000,000 of loan forgiveness for
married couples filing a joint return, and $1,000,000 for all others); See also 26 U.S.C. §
163(h)(3)(B)(i) (2010) (defining acquisition indebtedness (referenced in 26 U.S.C. §
108(h)(2)) as any indebtedness “incurred in acquiring, constructing, or substantially
improving any qualified residence of the taxpayer” and “secured by such residence.”);
McMahon & Simmons, supra note 1, at 467-68 (“[The tax exclusion] does not apply to (1)
indebtedness on a home that is not the taxpayer’s principal residence, or (2) home equity
indebtedness. Furthermore, the provision applies only if the debt cancellation was on
account of either (1) a decline in the value of the home, or (2) the taxpayer’s financial
condition. The taxpayer’s basis in the residence must be reduced by the excluded amount.
This basis reduction will not result in any subsequent income recognition as long as the
taxpayer does not dispose of the residence; and even if the taxpayer does sell the residence,
the taxpayer could exclude all or part of the realized gain under section 121.”); Charles J,
Russo, Jeffrey W. Mitchell Jr. & Seth Hammer, Tax Clinic, TAX ADVISER, Aug. 1, 2009, at
517 (“DOI [discharge of indebtedness] income includes discharge of an individual’s home
mortgage indebtedness. However, DOI income of a qualified principal residence is excluded
from gross income for debt discharges from January 1, 2007, to December 31, 2012 (Sec.
108(a)(1)(E)). The exclusion applies whether the taxpayer restructures the debt on the
principal residence or the debt is reduced because of foreclosure and sale (IR-2008-17). The
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This tax-free income, in the form of unpaid loan debt, can arise through
7
a foreclosure, through what is commonly known in real estate parlance
8
9
as a “short sale,” or through a significant loan modification.
exclusion is claimed on Form 982, Reduction of Tax Attributes Due to Discharge of
Indebtedness (and Section 1082 Basis Adjustment). The exclusion applies only to qualified
principal residence indebtedness, which is the same as acquisition indebtedness as defined
for purposes of the home mortgage interest deduction. Acquisition indebtedness generally
includes debt for acquiring, constructing, or substantially improving a principal residence.”).
7
See McMahon & Simmons, supra note 1, at 439 (“When a recourse debt secured by a
lien is reduced to judgment in a foreclosure suit, the amount realized on a subsequent sale of
the property is the actual sales price. Any deficiency resulting from a sales price less than
the judgment is a continuing obligation of the debtor, the discharge from which for less than
full payment will give rise to cancellation of debt income.”); But cf. SHARON KREIDER &
KAREN BROSI, 2010 REAL ESTATE & INVESTMENT TAX UPDATE, 3-30 (Western CPE 2010)
(explaining that if the mortgage is nonrecourse, meaning that the lender has agreed that
taking ownership of the property is its sole remedy, then no cancellation of debt income
arises from the lender’s foreclosure, even if the amount received upon foreclosure sale is
less than the mortgage debt owed); McMahon & Simmons, supra note 1, at 440 (“If the debt
is nonrecourse, then the full amount of the debt is treated as the amount realized on the
transfer of the property, regardless of the value of the property, and no cancellation of debt
income is realized.”).
8
See Gregg A. Nathanson, Real Property Law: What’s New in Residential
Transactions?, 86 MICH. B. J. 16, 18 (2007) (“A ‘short sale’ occurs when a mortgage lender
agrees to accept less than the total amount owed and releases the borrower from the
remaining unpaid indebtedness.”); See also KREIDER & BROSI, supra note 7, at 3-36 (“One
phenomenon in a declining residential mortgage market is dubbed a ‘short pay’ or a ‘short
sale,’ that is, the home is sold for less than (‘short of’) what is owed on the mortgage.
Property advertisements sometimes refer to it as a ‘pre-foreclosure’ sale. While the home is
marketed by the mortgage holder in foreclosure, it is marketed by the homeowner in a short
sale, generally with the disclosure ‘subject to lender approval.’ . . . In a short sale
transaction, the lender, not the property owner, makes the ultimate decision to sell. For the
property owner, a short sale is sometimes better for their [sic] credit rating then [sic] going
through foreclosure proceedings. For the lender, the short sale alternative cuts their [sic]
losses faster than the protracted foreclosure process.”); McMahon & Simmons, supra note
1, at 467-68 (“A short sale normally involves the sale of the property at or near market price
with the lender forgiving debt in excess of the sales price.”).
9
See Russo, Mitchell & Hammer, supra note 6, at 517 (“Under the general rule, a
modification is significant if, based on all the facts and circumstances, the legal rights or
obligations that are altered and the degree to which they are altered are economically
significant (Regs. Sec. 1.1001-3(e)(1)). Under Regs. Sec. 1.1001-3(e), there are four specific
categories that are considered to be significant modifications to a debt instrument: Changes
in yield; Changes in the timing of payments; Changes in obligor or security; and Changes in
the nature of the debt instrument.”); See also 26 U.S.C. § 108(e)(10) (2010); Michaels v.
Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1412, 1414-1416 (1986) (holding that lender’s discount for prepayment of
home mortgage gives rise to cancellation of debt income); 26 C.F.R.§ 1.1001-3(b); John E.
Capps, In the Wake of Cottage Savings: The Tax Consequences of Debt Modifications, 72
TEX. L. REV. 2015, 2018 (1994) (changes in yield, maturity, obligor, or collateral are
relevant in considering a modification of debt); McMahon & Simmons, supra note 1, at 428
(“Any reduction in the principal amount of a debt results in realization of cancellation of

Anderson Formatted.docx (Do Not Delete)12/12/2011 3:33 PM

2011

THE INJUSTICE OF MoFoDRA

5

MoFoDRA is part of a continuing saga of ill-conceived preferential
tax treatment for residential real estate that includes the 1997 legislation
that fueled housing speculation by granting up to half a million dollars
of tax free income, every two years, for profit arising from the sale of a
10
primary residence. When losses instead of profits became the issue,
Congress enacted MoFoDRA to grant up to two million dollars of tax
free income from unpaid mortgage debt. In this Article, I assert that
MoFoDRA raises continuing concerns regarding ethics, equality, and
equity in tax and public policy.
Perhaps guided by lobbyist dollars rather than policy-making logic,
Congress has failed to assemble coherent tax legislation related to
residential housing. MoFoDRA does not selectively limit its rewards to
those with low to moderate incomes who remain in their home and
continue paying a reduced mortgage obligation. Instead, MoFoDRA
rewards those who walk away from mortgage debt on a huge scale.
MoFoDRA allows up to two million dollars of tax-free income, and is
regressive by rewarding persons who aggressively speculated and stood
to reap the greatest benefit had they turned a profit. MoFoDRA violates
vertical equity due to its regressive impact, and violates horizontal
equity by virtue of its disparate treatment of similarly situated persons
by providing tax-free income for a random six year time period (2007
through 2012, inclusive). MoFoDRA discriminates against all other
persons who were taxed in the past, and who will be taxed in the future
for forgiven mortgage debt.
MoFoDRA’s tax-free treatment of discharged loan income
represents yet another zenith of imprudence in tax policy by creating a
reward and incentive for solvent individuals to be unaccountable for
residential real estate speculation. Congress’s singling out of a tax
preference for residential real estate speculators who walk away from
mortgage loan debt from 2007 through 2012 is unfair, unwise, and
11
creates a downward influence on residential real estate prices, thereby
debt income, regardless of whether a new debt instrument has been substituted or the
creditor simply agrees to accept a lesser amount in satisfaction of the debt.”).
10
See 26 U.S.C. § 121 (2010); See also Chang Cho, Business Property Sales Under
Secs. 1031 and 121, TAX ADVISER, Apr. 1, 2000, at 223-24 (“Under Sec. 121(b)(2), for the
sale of a principal residence on or after May 7, 1997, married couples filing jointly may
exclude up to $500,000 of gain ($250,000 for singles) . . . .“).
11
See Peter Salsich, National Affordable Housing Trust Fund Legislation: The
Subprime Mortgage Crisis Also Hits Renters, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 11, 24
(2011) (“Massive foreclosures of mortgages on both single-family and multi-family
residences in turn threaten many neighborhoods, particularly those with high concentrations
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punishing those who pay their debts and remain in their homes.
In the name of consistency, equality, and equity, I offer three
solutions to the tax exemption problem under MoFoDRA and any future
progeny. The first solution is that all discharged debt should be taxed as
income, and MoFoDRA’s tax exemption should be immediately
revoked. The second solution is that all discharged debt, mortgage or
otherwise, should not be taxed, and reparations should be paid to those
who were taxed in the past for this income. The third and perhaps most
pragmatic solution is that MoFoDRA should be amended to protect
lower and middle-income individuals who remain in their homes and
continue to pay their revised loan obligations.
Popular media coverage of those facing foreclosure tugs at the
12
heart strings. It is understandable to feel sympathy for those
individuals who have been innocently taken hostage by tough economic
times, and to feel empathy for those who exercised poor judgment by
counting on low interest rates and compounded growth in residential
real estate thereby causing such individuals to be overextended on a
mortgage.
Members of Congress have vehemently argued that MoFoDRA
13
was necessary to help such individuals. However, even prior to
of low-income and/or minority households.”); See generally Adam J. Levitin & Tara
Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 5-6 (2011) (“Foreclosures increase
housing supply and push down housing prices, affecting neighboring homeowners’ property
values and eroding property tax bases. This effect, in turn, hurts neighbors who have to bear
either higher taxes or reduced services.”).
12
See John L. Smith, Desperate Homeowners Find Little Help In Foreclosure Battles,
LAS VEGAS REV., Sept. 21, 2012, at 1B; Mike Tharp, Discussion Of Trying Times; Residents
Share Common Experiences Of Losing Homes, Worries About The Future, THE MERCED
SUN-STAR (CA), Mar. 8, 2010, at A1; Gregg Zoroya, Military Foreclosure Rate Up 32%
Over 2008; 20,000 Servicemembers, Veterans Lost Their Homes, USA TODAY, Feb. 4, 2011,
at 1A; See also Julie Schmit, In Housing Bust, A ‘New Normal,’ USA TODAY, Feb. 8, 2011,
at 1 (housing decline has resulted in massive numbers of “underwater mortgages” with
homeowners strapped to make ends meet); Julie Lynem, A Dream Foreclosed, TRIBUNE
(SAN LUIS OBISPO), Feb. 13, 2011, at 1 (loan modifications are difficult to obtain, resulting
in ongoing increase in foreclosures); Marlize Van Romburgh, Foreclosure Fiasco’s Ground
Zero, PAC. COAST BUS. TIMES, Oct. 22-28, 2010, at 1 (explaining that statewide in
California, one in every 178 housing units received a foreclosure filing in September 2010,
and a temporary moratorium on foreclosures simply delays a continued sink in residential
housing values).
13
See 153 CONG. REC. H11, 256 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 2007) (statement of Rep. Cardoza)
(“I have seen the joy in families’ eyes when they have been able to purchase their first home
and achieve the American Dream. I have seen the tears when they struggle to make their
payments and their dream is taken away . . . . The way I see it, if you are unfortunate
enough to lose your home to foreclosure because you are struggling, you have suffered

Anderson Formatted.docx (Do Not Delete)12/12/2011 3:33 PM

2011

THE INJUSTICE OF MoFoDRA

7

MoFoDRA, there already was, and is, a safety valve under the tax code
in the form of an exemption from taxation on any forgiven debt. This
insolvency exemption does not require the filing of bankruptcy, and it is
applied if the borrower meets the qualifications for being deemed as
14
insolvent. MoFoDRA goes beyond the built-in safety valve of the
Internal Revenue Code, and it gives solvent real estate speculators a tax
exempt status, offering a reward and shield to persons who engage in
strategic defaults and walk away from a home without actually being
insolvent.
Part 1 of this Article examines the discharge of indebtedness as a
form of income that should be taxed. Part 2 evaluates the so-called
“mortgage meltdown” and the resultant legislation providing a windfall
to those who benefit from non-payment of mortgage debt. Part 3
analyzes the public policy and ethical issues associated with the tax-free
windfall under MoFoDRA. Part 4 proposes practical and equitable
solutions to the disparate treatment and inequities from the tax
exemption contained in MoFoDRA.

enough. You shouldn’t be punished further by being taxed on what you no longer own.”);
153 CONG. REC. S15, 985 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2007) (statement of Sen. Sununu) (“The last
thing someone struggling to stay in their home needs is a huge tax obligation on income that
they never saw.”).
14
See 26 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1)(B) (2010) (“Gross income does not include any amount
which . . . would be includible in gross income by reason of the discharge (in whole or in
part) of indebtedness of the taxpayer if . . . (B) the discharge occurs when the taxpayer is
insolvent . . . .”); See also McMahon & Simmons, supra note 1, at 454-55 (“Section
108(a)(1)(B) excludes cancellation of debt income realized while the debtor is insolvent, as
defined by section 108(d)(3) . . . . Insolvency is defined in section 108(d)(3) as the excess
of the taxpayer’s liabilities over the fair market value of the taxpayer’s assets.”); 26 U.S.C. §
108(a)(1)(a) (2010) (“Gross income does not include any amount which . . . would be
includible in gross income by reason of the discharge (in whole or in part) of indebtedness
of the taxpayer if . . . (A) the discharge occurs in a title 11 case . . . . “); McMahon &
Simmons, supra note 1, at 460 (“An interesting--and for the taxpayer, unpleasant--result
occurs when the section 108(a)(1)(A) bankruptcy exception applies and a mortgage lien
survives the bankruptcy. When personal liability on the debt is discharged but the lien
survives, the debt is transformed into a nonrecourse debt. When the property is sold or
foreclosed upon, the amount of any remaining nonrecourse debt encumbering the property is
included in the amount realized by the taxpayer along with any cash received.”); Monica D.
Armstrong, From the Great Depression to the Current Housing Crisis: What Code Section
108 Tells Us About Congress’ Response to Economic Crisis, 26 AKRON TAX J. 69, 72-84
(2011); But see Jay L. Zagorsky & Lois R. Lupica, A Study Of Consumers’ Post-Discharge
Finances: Struggle, Stasis, Or Fresh-Start?, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 283, 294 (2008)
(data reflects Chapter 11 is rarely used in personal bankruptcy cases); Bankruptcy in the
United States, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bankruptcy_in_the_United_States (last visited
February 12, 2011) (“Chapter 11 filings by individuals are allowed, but are rare.”).
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I. FORGIVEN DEBT IS AN ACCESSION TO WEALTH, AND
THEREFORE CREATES TAXABLE INCOME
My former tax law professor said that revenue from any source is
income unless the tax code says otherwise. His postulate holds true to
what the Internal Revenue Code actually states, “Except as otherwise
provided, gross income means all income from whatever source
15
derived . . . .”
Loan proceeds are not customarily taxed due to the repayment
16
obligation of the borrower to repay the loan proceeds. However, when
a loan is forgiven, it is customarily treated as income of the borrower
17
under the Internal Revenue Code. This logical rule exists because a
loan which is unpaid effectively places income in the pocket of the
borrower, even if the borrower speculates with, and loses, the money.
Concurrently, the lender for an unpaid load is provided with a deduction
against income for the loss associated with the unpaid loan, thereby
18
balancing out the taxation of the transaction.
If the loan transaction is viewed as a whole, when a borrower
receives money in a loan transaction and is later discharged from the
liability without repaying the debt, the borrower has realized an
accession to wealth. Recognizing the existence of income in this
situation generally is not a problem for the income tax system. The
receipt of the proceeds of a loan is not income because the receipt is
15
See 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(12) (2010) (“Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle,
gross income means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to)
the following items . . . (12) Income from discharge of indebtedness . . . .”).
16
See supra note 1.
17
See supra note 2; See also Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. at 1 (holding that taxpayer
corporation had issued bonds and subsequently repurchased the bonds for less than face
value. U.S. Supreme Court ruled that this generated income: “[T]he taxpayer made a clear
gain. As a result of its dealings it made available $137,521.30 [of] assets previously offset
by the obligation of bonds now extinct . . . The [taxpayer] has realized within the year an
accession to income, if we take words in their plain popular meaning, as they should be
taken here.”); Id. at 3.; See generally Fred T. Witt, Jr. & William H. Lyons, An Examination
of the Tax Consequences of Discharge of Indebtedness, 10 VA. TAX REV. 1 (1990)
(providing an historic analysis of the topic); McMahon & Simmons, supra note 1
(providing an extensive analysis of cancellation of debt as income, including the recent
home mortgage exception).
18
See 26 U.S.C. § 166 (2010); See also TOPIC 453 BAD DEBT DEDUCTION,
http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc453.html; McMahon & Simmons, supra note 1, at 416
(“Every loan charge-off and mortgage foreclosure has tax consequences. While the creditor
most often claims a bad-debt deduction or business-related loss, the debtor generally must
recognize gross income and pay income taxes on an amount roughly equal to the creditor’s
loss, unless a special exception applies to exclude the debt relief from income.”).
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offset by an obligation to repay the borrowed amount. If the
obligation to repay the borrowed amount is eliminated or reduced
without the concomitant repayment, the borrower realizes an
accession to wealth that, as a matter of tax theory, should be included
19
in gross income.

An unpaid and forgiven loan is attributed as income of the
borrower, regardless of whether the borrower used the money to buy
stock which declined in value, bought black tar heroin which turned out
to be counterfeit, or, without MoFoDRA, speculated in residential real
20
estate.
21
Forgiven mortgage debt is akin to untaxed wage income. The
recipient of a mortgage loan receives the benefit as well as constructive
custody and control of loan proceeds which are used to speculate on
residential real estate. Instead of repaying the debt, which is the
22
cornerstone of income exclusion, the borrower never repays the debt.
The borrower receives the benefit of the proceeds by gaining ownership
of the home, subject to the collateral interest secured by a deed of trust,
19

McMahon & Simmons, supra note 1, at 415.
See generally McMahon & Simmons, supra note 1, at 426 (“In theory, realization of
cancellation of debt income does not depend on the nature of the debt.”) and Zelenak, supra
note 2, at 285 (“Borrowed funds are excluded from income in the first instance because the
taxpayer’s obligation to repay the funds offsets any increase in the taxpayer’s assets; if the
taxpayer is thereafter released from his obligation to repay, the taxpayer enjoys a net
increase in assets equal to the forgiven portion of the debt, and the basis for the original
exclusion thus evaporates.”) But see Zarin v. Commissioner, 916 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1990),
rev’g 92 T.C. 1084 (1989) (Tax Court ruled that forgiven gambling debt was taxable
income, but Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that the forgiven debt was not taxable
because the amount owed was not “indebtedness” within the ambit of Internal Revenue
Code 108(d)(1) and also that Zarin disputed the validity of the debt, even though the value
of the underlying gambling chips and extension of credit was undisputed). See also,
Zelenak, supra note 2, at 319-325 (discussion of Zarin case and comment that the Zarin
majority opinion is technically indefensible and widely criticized).
21
See Rachel Carlton, Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007, 45 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 601, 610 (2008) (“For instance, if, upon property acquisition, a $500,000 mortgage is
secured by a home worth $500,000, the homeowner’s net worth is unchanged. If the lender
later extinguishes a portion of the homeowner’s mortgage debt, the liability decreases and a
corresponding increase in net worth results. Continuing with the example, if the lender
decreases the mortgage debt owed to $400,000, the homeowner’s net worth increases to
$100,000. From a tax law perspective, the homeowner has realized a gain; and according to
generally accepted tax theory this gain should be taxable as income.”). See generally supra
notes 1-2 (discussing that unlike other types of forgiven debt which is treated as taxable
income, under MoFoDRA the borrower derives an immediate direct economic benefit of the
loan proceeds extended to him/her coupled with no tax on the unpaid debt).
22
See generally supra notes 1-2 (discussing that receipt of loan proceeds is not income
because it is offset with the obligation to repay the borrowed amount).
20
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23

mortgage, or similar instrument.
Members of Congress who oppose taxation of income from
24
forgiven mortgage loans like to use the mantra “phantom income.”
There is nothing phantom about the income. The recipient of the loan
received the benefit of those funds, used those funds for a purpose
which he or she selected (i.e. to buy residential real estate), and did not
repay those funds.
Senators and Representatives are concerned that without the new
exemption [of income under MoFoDRA], taxpayers will pay taxes
on phantom income. But it is not phantom income. If a taxpayer has
a mortgage of $1000 per month and the house is foreclosed on
because he or she cannot afford the $1000 per month payment, the
taxpayer may move into an apartment and pay $500 per month. That
is $500 less per month than what the taxpayer owed on the mortgage,
which is $500 more the taxpayer can keep or spend on other things.
Moreover, it has long been the policy of the tax code that where a
taxpayer’s assets are freed from the obligation to secure a debt, the
25
taxpayer has incurred taxable income.

MoFoDRA provides an incentive to those real estate speculators
who are solvent, but who elect to strategically walk away from a home.
“In short, the financial costs of foreclosure, while not insignificant, are
minimal compared to the financial benefit of strategic default,
particularly for seriously underwater homeowners. For many, default is
26
the ‘in-the-money’ option by any objective measure.”

23

See generally TED H. GORDON, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE LAW 267 (6th ed. 2006)
(explaining that title in a mortgage remains with the person who is borrowing money to
purchase the home, and is a contract by which the property is pledged without delivery for
repayment of the underlying loan); Fannie Mae, Form 3005, UNIFORM SECURITY
INSTRUMENT: California Deed of Trust §§ 18 and 23, available at
http://www.freddiemac.com/uniform/unifsecurity.html#highlights (deed of trust as collateral
security with transfer rights in the borrower); Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure,
Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 78 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1359, 1367 (2010) (“At closing the homeowner signs a promissory note on behalf
of the originating lender and a mortgage or deed of trust with the originator as the
mortgagee or the trust beneficiary.”)
24
See Carlton, supra note 21, at 609; See also Rue Toland, No Tax for “Phantom
Income:” How Congress Failed To Encourage Responsible Housing Consumption With Its
Recent Tax Legislation, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 345, 352-53 (2010).
25
Curt Hochbein, Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007, 38 CAP. U. L. REV.
889, 917-18 (2010).
26
Brent T. White, Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear, and The Social
Management Of The Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971, 986 (2010).
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II. THE SO CALLED “MORTGAGE MELTDOWN” AND
EXCLUSION OF FORGIVEN DEBT AS INCOME FROM 2007
THROUGH 2012
As of the end of the second quarter of 2011, there was
approximately thirteen and a half trillion dollars of mortgage debt
27
outstanding in the U.S. Within this pool of mortgage debtors,
. . . it has been credibly estimated that there are at least 11.3 million
U.S. homeowners, and probably as many as 15.2 million or more,
who are ‘underwater’ in that the outstanding balances on their
mortgages exceed the market value of their homes . . . . These two
estimates constitute 23% and 32.2%, respectively, of all mortgaged
residential properties, and some informed observers expect this
percentage to sharply increase to as high as 48% by 2011 if property
28
values continue to decline in some areas of the country.

Congress is responsible for the residential real estate bubble due to
its 1997 legislation granting tax free treatment for profits in residential
29
real estate. Not only is Congress to blame for the bubble, but is also
now to blame for solvent individuals walking away from ill conceived
acquisitions of residential real estate, thereby driving down prices for
30
those who hold on to their homes and pay their debts.
MoFoDRA is proof that residential real estate is Congress’ favorite
child, and why shouldn’t it be? A mantra calling for every citizen to
27
FED. RESERVE STATISTICS AND HISTORICAL DATA, MORTGAGE DEBT OUTSTANDING
(2011),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/
mortoutstand/current.htm.
28
Gregory Scott Crespi, The Trillion Dollar Problem of Underwater Homeowners:
Avoiding A New Surge of Foreclosures by Encouraging Principal-Reducing Loan
Modifications, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 153, 155 (2011).
29
See generally Toland, supra note 24 (examining various recent tax laws, including
MoFoDRA, and positing that Congress has failed to address the problems which caused,
and continue to fuel, the residential housing bubble); Bradford P. Anderson, Welcome to My
Flipperhood: A Call to Repair the Residential Real Estate Tax Swindle, 7 GEO. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 415, 417 (2009) (detailing how the 1997 Taxpayer Relief Act changed the tax code to
allow the sale of a primary residence for up to half a million dollars of tax-free federal
income, with only a two year ownership and occupancy requirement. This tax preference
fanned the flames of speculation and irrational exuberance in the residential housing sector
and also set the stage for a far reaching overall financial meltdown. Financial markets have
succumbed to the artifice of tax-free incentives targeted at residential real estate, with
devastating results); 26 U.S.C. § 121 (2010); Chang Cho, Business Property Sales Under
Secs. 1031 and 121, TAX ADVISER, Apr. 1, 2000, at 223 (“Under Sec. 121(b)(2), for the sale
of a principal residence on or after May 7, 1997, married couples filing jointly may exclude
up to $500,000 of gain ($250,000 for singles) . . . .”).
30
See supra note 11.
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own his or her own home is politically popular, but perhaps the plea
should only apply to every fiscally responsible citizen.Legislation is
influenced by money, and there was big money from the residential real
estate sector and financial loan sector pumped in to Congress in order to
32
support passage of MoFoDRA.
No other type of forgiven debt, whether credit card, auto loan, or
33
otherwise, benefits from the singular preferential treatment that
Congress has conferred upon residential real estate. Those who roll the
dice on residential real estate get to walk away from their debts on a tax
free basis under MoFoDRA. The message from Congress is to act
irresponsibly, and hope that many others do the same, because then you
will receive preferential treatment.
Congress adopted the position that MoFoDRA is justified due to
the fortuity of circumstances and market conditions out of the
34
taxpayer’s control. If Congress is so in tune with market conditions
outside of one’s control, then why was there no tax relief for stock
35
market investors during the “dot com” decline? Congress failed to
31

See generally President George W. Bush, Remark at the Signing of H.R. 3648, The
Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 (Dec. 20, 2007) (on file with White House
Office of Press Sec’y) (“We want people to have a place they can call their own. After all,
it’s an essential part of the American Dream. And we want that dream to extend throughout
our nation. - President George W. Bush”).
32
See
generally
MAPLIGHT,
http://maplight.org/us-congress/bill/110-hr3648/323588/total-contributions (last visited Feb. 16, 2011) (Maplight.org report on
contributions to members of the U.S. Senate for passage of MoFoDRA showing a total of
$15,411,298 paid in contributions to U.S. Senators for passage of this bill, of which
$15,068,073 originated from real estate agents, finance, insurance & real estate interests,
and mortgage bankers and brokers); MAPLIGHT, http://maplight.org/us-congress/bill/110-hr3648/376414/total-contributions (last visited Feb. 16, 2011) (Maplight.org report on
contributions to members of the U.S. House of Representatives for passage of MoFoDRA
showing a total of $11,691,876 paid in contributions to members of the U.S. House of
Representatives for this bill, of which $11,050,276 originated from real estate agents,
finance, insurance & real estate interests, and mortgage bankers and brokers) Additional
sums were also contributed for the extension of MoFoDRA, through the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. See MAPLIGHT, http://maplight.org/uscongress/bill/110-hr-1424/352600/contributions-by-vote;
MAPLIGHT,
http://maplight.org/us-congress/bill/110-hr-1424/352600/total-contributions
(discussing
extensive lobbying payments by security brokers, investment companies, commercial banks,
and finance companies).
33
But cf. Mark J. Marroni, Zarin v. Commissioner: Does a Gambler Have Income From
the Cancellation of a Casino Debt?, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 993, 994-1000 (1993) (explaining
that in this particular case, the gambler’s debt owed to the casino was not enforceable as a
matter of New Jersey law, and therefore there was no discharge of indebtedness).
34
See generally Carlton, supra note 21, at 611-13.
35
See generally Wayne A. Smith, Tax Treatment of Employee Stock Options in High-
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come to the rescue of those suffering massive losses during this market
decline, and press coverage indicated a less than sympathetic attitude to
36
the victims of the decline. “Dot com” victims were the sacrificial
lambs, and residential housing remains the sacred cow. This perverse
tax treatment is untenable and indefensible.
Congress’ fueling of residential real estate speculation with up to
37
half a million dollars of tax free gain every two years coupled with real
estate agents and mortgage lenders who market residential housing as
an “investment,” instead of a home in which to live, have thrust the Las
38
Vegas mentality of gambling into residential real estate. MoFoDRA is
to intelligent tax legislation what the Titanic was to sink-proof
shipbuilding.

Tech Industry: When the Market Crashes, Make Sure You’re Not on the Corner of Easy
Street and Alternative Minimum Tax Boulevard, 13 ALB. L. J. SCI. & TECH 865, 880-885
(2003) (discussing that alternative minimum tax liability resulted in many individuals
paying large tax bills but having no actual gain after the high technology market collapse;
although Congress was aware of this problem, no revisions to alternative minimum tax
occurred to remedy the harm).
36
See generally Michelle Quinn & Kamika Dunlap, Silicon Valley Slide; The Heart of
the Tech Boom Has Seen a Lot of Businesses and its Extravagant Lifestyle Go Bust, But
Some Optimism Remains, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Aug. 20, 2002, at 1E (“When the
mighty fall, as Silicon Valley has done, it’s natural for others to take pleasure from it.
‘There’s a sense that people think, “You guys got what you deserved,’” said Michael
Perkins, author of ‘The Internet Bubble.’”); The Dot Com Debacle, NEW YORK OBSERVER,
Mar. 12, 2001, at 4 (“The downfall of the dot-coms may be a good thing for the long-term
health of the city, as we witness a return to the values of work and patience, and as young
professionals realize there is virtue in holding a job instead of hopping from one so-called
“opportunity” to another. After all, earning a salary, rather than depending on options and
playing the markets, is where the smart money always places it bets in the end.”); When Dot
Coms Ruled, Nov. 13, 2000, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (“Many of these businesses deserved to
die.”).
37
See supra note 29.
38
See generally Mark Andrew Snider, The Suburban Advantage: Are the Tax Benefits
of Homeownership Defensible, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 157, 157-158 (2005) (“If owning a home
is the American dream, then owning a home might also be described as a tax dream ....”);
Keep the Tax Man Away from Real-Estate Gains, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Nov. 20, 2002,
available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20021122115127/http://www.realestatejournal.com/buysell/mort
gages/20021120-smartmoney.html. (“If you’ve owned your home and have lived in it for
two of the previous five years, then you can make a profit of up to $250,000 if you’re single
or $500,000 if you’re married, with no tax bill. You may however owe state taxes. Never the
less, this deal is so good that you should do everything you possibly can to get it.”).
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III. THE INJUSTICE OF NOT TAXING FORGIVEN DEBT.
39

“Justice isn’t blind; it just looks the other way.”

A. Equity and Consistency: Things that are alike should be
treated similarly.
“Adam Smith’s first canon of taxation was that taxes should be
equal or equitable. . . . Aristotle, John Locke, and Adam Smith
provided the philosophical foundation for a requirement of equality in
40
taxation.” MoFoDRA in every respect is contrary to these great minds,
and Congress now supports inequality and inequity as a standard
baseline.
Under John Rawls’ Theory of Justice, MoFoDRA violates his two
principles of justice in that the current law does not guarantee an equal
41
claim to basic rights, and there is no equality of opportunity. “The
original purpose of equality in taxation was to prevent both privilege
and oppression. In ancient regimes, some were able to receive
exemptions from taxation while others without influence paid the bulk
42
of the taxes.” The current exclusion of taxation on forgiven residential
mortgage debt favors the wealthy and those who engaged in high stakes
speculation because our progressive tax scheme affords those
43
individuals the greatest tax exemption benefit. A wealthy individual
39

1981).

THE BOOMTOWN RATS, The Elephants Graveyard, on MONDO BONGO (CBS Records

40
William B. Barker, The Three Faces of Equality: Constitutional Requirements in
Taxation, 57 CASE W. RES. 1, 8 (2006).
41
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Equality, Liberty, And A Fair Income Tax, 23 FORDHAM
URB. L. J. 607, 623-24 (1996);
see also, Peter Halewood, Law’s Bodies: Disembodiment and the Structure of Liberal
Property Rights, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 1331, 1346 (1996) (“John Rawls - probably the most
influential liberal theorist of our time - draws on Kant to argue that justice should be
understood as fairness.”).
42
Barker, supra note 40, at 13.
43
See Internal Revenue Service, Tax Guide 2010 for Individuals 17, at 137-201 (2010),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p17.pdf; Andres Martinez, It’s Your Housing
Bubble And I’m Paying For It, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 26, 2005, at C-2 (“All
deductions are regressive by nature because they are worth more to taxpayers with higher
incomes. The Treasury will give you a $1,500 break for every $10,000 in mortgage interest
you pay if you are in the 15 percent tax bracket, but you’ll get a $2,800 break on the same
deal if you are wealthier and paying a 28 percent marginal tax on your income. Isn’t this
backward? The deduction is a massive handout to the real estate industry, and a federal
subsidy to the lifestyles of the nation’s richest households.”); see also Anthony C. Infanti,
Tax Equity, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1195 (2008) (Tax equity is concerned with the fair
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receives a greater tax benefit from untaxed forgiven mortgage debt, not
just in real dollars, but proportionately than a lower income individual.
Currently in America there is widespread concern that the middle
class is shrinking. It is becoming more difficult for many in the
middle class to maintain their position, and the upper classes are
expanding, thus creating a wider gap between the ‘haves and the
have-nots’ . . . [with] the potential of negatively affecting the
44
economy and creating political instability.

As an example of MoFoDRA’s regressive impact, assume that
William is single with an annual adjusted gross income of $200,000.
45
William is in a 33% federal marginal income tax bracket, paying
thirty-three cents in federal tax for every dollar of income at this level.
When William walks away from his expensive home and receives
another $300,000 in untaxed forgiven debt, his highest marginal benefit
46
increases up to 35% of the forgiven debt. Meanwhile, Susan, a middle
income single person, has an adjusted gross income of $40,000. She is
47
in a 25% federal marginal income tax bracket. When Susan’s middle
class home is foreclosed upon, Susan realizes an additional $30,000 in
forgiven debt, still within the 25% marginal tax bracket. Susan’s tax
benefit under MoFoDRA is 25% of the forgiven debt, while wealthy
William receives a regressive benefit ranging between 33-35% of the
forgiven debt. This regressive treatment unfairly favors high income
individuals who gambled on a major scale, providing substantially less
benefit to lower income individuals. If the goal of Congress was to help
treatment of individuals who have the same or different incomes); Richard H. Thaler, It’s
Time To Rethink The Charity Deduction, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Dec. 19, 2010, Sunday
Business Section, at 5 (explaining that due to our progressive marginal tax bracket system,
mortgage deductions and charitable deductions are magnified in favor of the highest income
individuals).
44
Susan Pace Hamill, A Moral Perspective On The Role of Education in Sustaining the
Middle Class, 24 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB POL’Y 309, 309-10 (2010); see also
Susan Pace Hamill, Ideologies of Entire Systems: A Moral Perspective on “Big Business”
Fair Share of America’s Tax Burden, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 857, 869 (2004) (“All
reasonable tax policy experts conclude that tax structures should not be regressive . . . .”).
45
Internal Revenue Service, Tax Guide 2010 for Individuals 17, at 267 (2010),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p17.pdf.
46
Id. In this example, William has an adjusted gross income of $200,000, plus an
additional $300,000 of forgiven loan debt which is untaxed under MoFoDRA (totaling
$500,000 of adjusted gross income). William’s marginal rate is 33% on the adjusted gross
income up to $373,650, accounting for his $200,000 of income plus $173,650 of forgiven
loan debt, with the remainder of the forgiven loan debt ($126,350) benefitting William in
the 35% marginal tax bracket.
47
Id.
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the downtrodden, then why not place some reasonable middle class
income caps on the tax exclusion rather than the upper class caps?
Additionally, states with legislation which conforms to MoFoDRA
confer further tax benefits upon those who are solvent and walk away
48
from mortgage debt.
49
In addition to the vertical equity problem described above,
MoFoDRA violates horizontal equity by treating persons at the same
income level and in the same circumstances differently, purely on the
fortuity of whether the debt was, or will be, forgiven between 2007 and
2012. “Horizontal equity reflects the notion that similarly situated
50
taxpayers should carry the same burden.” Under MoFoDRA, two
people with the same identical income level and circumstances are
treated differently. Person A is taxed for forgiven mortgage debt if it
occurs prior to 2007, or after 2012. Meanwhile, person B receives the
exact same discharged debt and resultant income in 2007 through 2012,
and person B is not taxed.
The formal concept of HE [horizontal equity] has its roots in the
literature of public finance economics. Indeed, some trace the notion
of HE as a fundamental tax principle to John Stuart Mill, who opined
that a tax system ought to demand an equal tax burden from
taxpayers with equal capacity to contribute. Twentieth century
economists fleshed out that idea further, and Richard Musgrave gave
48
See DeLoitte MultiState Tax, External Update, California Updates Federal Tax
Conformity to January 1, 2009 (Apr. 15, 2010), available at
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/DcomUnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/Tax/us_tax_multistate_CA_4-16-2010.pdf. See
generally CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17144.5; California Tax Conformity Bill, 2010 Cal.
Stat. S.B. 401, § 93 (2010) available at
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/DcomUnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/Tax/us_tax_multistate_CA_4-162010.pdfhttp://www.deloitte.com/assets/DcomUnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/Tax/us_tax_multistate_CA_4-16-2010.pdf
(conforming partially to federal law, but with a lower exclusion of income than under
MoFoDRA).
49
See Susan Pace Hamill, An Argument for Tax Reform Based on Judeo-Christian
Ethics, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2002) [hereinafter Hamill Alabama] (“Vertical equity, which
primarily focuses on the taxpayer’s ability to pay the tax, seeks to define how to fairly
apportion the tax burden among taxpayers with different levels of income and wealth.
Progressive taxes significantly factor in ability to pay by requiring taxpayers with a greater
ability to pay to bear a higher burden, while regressive taxes disregard ability to pay by
imposing a heavier burden on taxpayers with less ability to pay.”).
50
Leo P. Martinez, The Trouble with Taxes: Fairness, Tax Policy, and the Constitution,
31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 413, 422 (2004).
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51

MoFoDRA also confuses those with rational minds who thrive
upon consistency because the legislation imposes inconsistent
52
treatment. For example, you go to a restaurant and order a glass of iced
tea from your server. Your server brings you iced tea. When you ask for
a refill of iced tea, you next receive lemonade, and then vodka, and then
finally spicy salsa in your glass. You would be understandably puzzled,
having no idea of what might occur next. Indeed, you would find meal
planning difficult, never knowing what to expect next. MoFoDRA’s
bizarre tax free zone, coupled with a reinstatement of taxation on
forgiven home loans in 2013, puzzles the mind of a rational human and
begs for an explanation of where the consistency lies.
MoFoDRA’s selective and preferential treatment of residential real
estate speculators runs counter to the moral evaluation of tax policy
proposed by tax scholar Susan Pace Hamill, who posits that a moral
53
evaluation of tax policy is essential to determine sound tax policy. She
believes that a moral evaluation of tax policy is essential to
determine sound tax policy. Hamill argues that a moral evaluation of
tax policy is the only valid metric that can be used to choose among
competing tax regimes because the economic models that have been
used to evaluate tax policy are fatally flawed through their use of
limited variables . . . . Hamill argues that Judeo-Christian ethical
51

Brian Galle, Tax Fairness, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1323, 1329 (2008).
See Joshua D. Sarnoff, Equality as Uncertainty, 84 IOWA L. REV. 377, 388 (1999)
(“[P]rescriptive equality thus exerts its force by urging decisionmakers [sic] to seek greater
certainty before deciding what treatment people deserve and before treating them unequally
in the name of dispensing justice.”).
53
Susan Pace Hamill, An Evaluation Of Federal Tax Policy Based On Judeo-Christian
Ethics, 25 VA. TAX REV. 671, 673-675 (2006) [hereinafter Hamill Virginia]. See also,
Hamill Alabama, supra note 49, at 3-4 (“This Article applies the moral principles of JudeoChristian ethics as a basis for urging the citizens of Alabama to insist that Alabama’s elected
political leaders reform Alabama’s state tax structure, a critically important step towards
ensuring that Alabama’s children, especially children from low-income families, enjoy an
opportunity to build a positive future. Although using these principles as a reason to support
tax reform may seem unusual, principles of Judeo-Christian ethics offer moral arguments
that complement and often strengthen secularly based ethical arguments illustrating the need
for social reform. Throughout American history, the moral principles of Judeo-Christian
ethics have been used as one of many effective tools to evaluate and reform a wide variety
of social structures, and have continued to be invoked in political debates. Moreover, when
distinguishing ethical from unethical tax structures, Judeo-Christian ethics use broad
principles similar to traditional tax policy theory, both indicating that tax burdens should be
apportioned according to some measure of the taxpayer’s ability to pay and should raise
adequate revenues to meet at least the minimum needs of the community subject to the
tax.”)
52
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principles “require tax policy structures that both raise adequate
revenues providing all citizens a reasonable opportunity to reach
their potential, and allocate the burden for paying the taxes under a
moderately progressive model.”
. . . . Hamill concludes that a valid Judeo-Christian tax policy must
strike a balance between respecting individual property rights and
54
providing everyone with a chance to realize their potential.

Rather than individual accountability and societal participation,
MoFoDRA represents the pinnacle of individual favoritism. MoFoDRA
excludes equal treatment of all others who have carried the burden of
taxes on discharged mortgage debt outside of the “no-tax” window from
2007-2012. “Objectivist ethics views human beings as independent
agents and deems each person acting in his or her own long-term
rational self-interest as the only avenue to reach moral correctness . . .
[I]ndividual autonomy and the right of each person to be able to
personally benefit from their efforts in the free market are valued above
55
all other considerations . . . .”
The real threat of the objectivist ethics model represented by
MoFoDRA is the self-centered preferential treatment coupled with the
lack of accountability and elimination of social responsibility for the
behavior of the individual. That is, those who overextended themselves
are viewed as victims of circumstance and receive tax free income,
while those who did not overextend themselves receive no such benefit
and carry the entire burden of residential real estate speculation.
Objectivist ethics represents a form of atheism because the human
person is substituted for a supreme deity. Within the framework of
objectivist ethics, individuals owe no moral obligations to endure
greater sacrifices for anyone else’s benefit because only each
individual’s own self-interest has any moral relevance. Human
beings acting in their long-term self-interest are considered the sole
source of all wealth, and through the strength of their own rationality
56
are viewed as capable of acting morally . . . .

Those who overextended themselves and speculated on residential
real estate are being rewarded by Congress for their imprudence, which
54
W. Edward Afield, Dining with Tax Collectors: Reducing the Tax Gap Through
Church-Government Partnerships, 7 RUTGERS BUS. L. J. 53, 107-108 (2010).
55
Hamill Virginia, supra note 53, at 739-40. See also, Halewood, supra note 39, at
1387 (“The progression from Kantian abstract universalism to communicative ethics is a
progression from an objectivist ethics and epistemology to an intersubjective model.”).
56
Hamill Virginia, supra note 53, at 743-44 (internal citations omitted).
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is simply unfair. “To Aristotle, equality was the measure of justice; the
57
unjust is unequal, the just is equal.” In Aristotelian theory, “things that
58
are alike should be treated alike . . . “ That being the case, either all
forgiven debt should not be taxed, whether residential mortgage debt or
otherwise, or all forgiven debt should be taxed as income because it
represents an accession to wealth. “Equality is all about determining
59
who equals are.” Forgiven residential mortgage debt is a superior
among equals.
B. A Superior Among Equals: Disparate Treatment is not an
Unfamiliar Face in Tax Law.
“The idea of equality may be particularly problematic as a restraint
60
on governments’ power to tax.” From a constitutional perspective of
equality, proportional taxation or a fair distribution of taxes would
require, at a minimum, that the identical same source of income, for
61
example, forgiven mortgage debt, should be taxed.
Taking consistency and equality to its natural and necessary result,
one could argue that the disparate treatment of forgiven mortgage debt
constitutes a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Although at first
blush this may be attractive, “[t]he history of the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence shows a move from an individual, rights-based concept of
equality to a regime that appears to have no real concept of equality in
57

Barker, supra note 40, at 5.
Id.
59
Id. at 36; see also id. at 48 (“The three faces of equality have been described as
classical, social, and popular. Classical equality is an individual, rights-based principle that
limits government action that aims oppressive measures at certain taxpayers while giving
unwarranted privileges to others . . . . Social equality is a communal, group-based principle
that relies on a constitutional vision of a more equal society premised on a fairer distribution
of resources . . . Popular equality is popularly constituted equality. Its content is a matter of
current political choice.”).
60
Id. at 2.
61
KREIDER & BROSI, supra note 7, at 3-31 (mentioning that there exists another problem
of inequality in the tax treatment of discharged or excused non-recourse mortgage debt. A
non-recourse loan is a situation where the lender looks only to the collateral (home) for
recovery, and not any other assets of the borrower. . . “[T]here will never be COD
[cancellation of debt] income in the foreclosure of a property with nonrecourse debt.”); see
also, McMahon & Simmons, supra note 1, at 426-27 (noting that a borrower who retains
ownership of the property will realize cancellation of debt income, but that if “property
subject to a nonrecourse debt is deeded to the lender in lieu of foreclosure, the entire amount
of the nonrecourse debt is included in the amount realized on the sale of the property, even
if the debt exceeds the fair market value of the property at the time of transfer.”); Frederick
H. Robinson, Nonrecourse Indebtedness, 11 VA. TAX REV. 1, 37-39 (1991).
58
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tax at all . . . leading to almost complete deference to the legislature in
62
tax matters.”
This deference to the legislative branch in creating tax preferences
is the foundation of disparate treatment and the resultant lack of equity
contained in MoFoDRA.
[M]any incentives clearly have nothing to do with the objective of
fairness in taxation since their purpose is to treat taxpayers
differently not on the basis of their particular circumstances,
including their benefits received or their ability to pay, but instead on
63
the basis of public purposes that intentionally distort equality.

An Equal Protection argument from one who was taxed on
forgiven debt prior to MoFoDRA is highly unlikely to meet with
success.
Unless the classification infringes a fundamental constitutional right
(other than the right to equality), Congress is given the widest
latitude in taxation to make distinctions between taxpayers. A
legislative enactment represents a legislative determination that the
classified persons or objects of taxation are, in fact, dissimilar. Such
a determination cannot be overturned unless the classification does
not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.
There is no requirement that the legislature supply this purpose, and
the legislation will be sustained as long as the courts find any
justification. Indeed, the taxpayer must ‘negative every conceivable
basis which might support’ the legislative classification. Though
there is a requirement that there be a relation between justification
and classification, the courts only require a plausible connection, not
a provable one. In the case of individualized relief provisions for
special taxpayers, it may be sufficient that Congress concluded that
these few individuals faced hardship. Whether they did or did not is
not judicially relevant. Speculation as to whether the classification
was overinclusive is irrelevant; simply unwise legislation is not
unconstitutional legislation . . . Though modern taxation often
creates extreme differences in the taxation of quite economically
similar taxpayers, these disparities have not been viewed as
involving the wholesale shifting of the tax burden from one class to
64
another.

Imagine that you lost your home to foreclosure in December of
2006. Assume that you had a $250,000 mortgage, and upon foreclosure,
62
63
64

Barker, supra note 40, at 4-5.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 34-35 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).
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the home sold for $200,000. You would have $50,000 of discharged
debt that would be fully taxed. Assuming that you are in a 25 percent
federal marginal tax bracket, this is $12,500 of federal tax that you owe
for the cancelled residential mortgage debt, plus any state income tax.
Yet if you had fortuitously defaulted and been foreclosed upon one
month later, you would have zero tax liability. MoFoDRA is roulette
wheel tax policy from Congress.
What if Congress had addressed the right of women to vote in the
65
same fashion as MoFoDRA? What if the Nineteenth Amendment,
granting women the right to vote, would have only existed for six years,
with an automatic repeal clause to take effect thereafter? If something is
wrong, like prohibiting women from voting, it needs to be resolved
permanently. If taxing forgiven loan debt is wrong, then it should be
permanently addressed by MoFoDRA. Alternatively, if taxing forgiven
loan debt is the right thing to do, then we should always do it.
MoFoDRA’s peculiar six-year preferential treatment of those who are
solvent, but walk away from imprudent speculation in residential real
66
estate, is a bizarre state of affairs. Even the prohibition of alcohol did
not contain an automatic expiration. When Congress subsequently
67
decided that it was bad policy, the prohibition was repealed. With
MoFoDRA, Congress has adopted the following rationale: Good idea to
tax forgiven mortgage debt prior to 2007; bad idea to tax from 2007
68
through 2012; good idea to tax in 2013 and thereafter.

65

U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII.
67
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
68
See supra note 4 (MoFoDRA, as enacted and codified, took effect with the 2007 tax
year, and by virtue of the text of the statute, terminates if the debt is discharged before
January 1, 2013, i.e. by the conclusion of the tax year 2012).
66
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C. Shoddy Tax Policy: Rewarding Bad Conduct and Fiscal
Irresponsibility.
“The world owes me a living . . . I’m gonna take your money;
count your loss when I’m gone. I’m alright Jack; I’m lookin’ after
69
number one.”
With human activity influenced by the tax code, Congress has
reinforced speculation in residential real estate through MoFoDRA.
“[T]he power to tax may well be the most important of all governmental
powers; not only does tax revenue make all other powers practically
possible, but tax in itself has enormous capacity to mold human
70
activity.”
71
In a period of an increasing government deficit, MoFoDRA’s tax
exemption imposes the cost of real estate speculation on innocent
bystanders. As I describe in this Article, MoFoDRA has transferred the
externalities and opportunity cost of speculating in residential real
72
estate from those who overextended themselves and/or engaged in
imprudent speculation onto the shoulders of those individuals who pay
their debts, pay tax on their income, and act in a fiscally responsible
manner.
A tax system, unlike a theory of the universe, must not only be
69

THE BOOMTOWN RATS, Lookin’ After One, on THE BOOMTOWN RATS (CBS Records

1977).
70

Barker, supra note 40, at 1.
See generally Howard Schneider, U.S. Must Reduce Deficit, IMF Warns, WASH.
POST, Jan. 28, 2011, at A16 (“The IMF warning comes as federal officials grapple with a
congressional projection this week that the annual deficit will reach a historic $1.5 trillion
this year. This was the latest report to raise concerns about how massive government debts
in developed countries could undermine the global economic recovery.”); U.S. Deficit to Hit
Record $1.5 Trillion, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Jan. 27, 2011, at 22 (“A continuing weak
economy and last month’s bipartisan tax cut legislation will drive the government’s deficit
to a record $1.5 trillion this year, a new government estimate predicts. The eye-popping
numbers mean the government will continue to borrow 40 cents for every dollar it
spends.”); Seth McLaughlin, Deficit Diggers Now Vow to Fill Hole; Both Parties Bear Debt
Blame, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2011, at 1 (“During Mr. Bush’s eight years in office, the
national debt jumped from $5.628 billion to $9.98 trillion. Mr. Obama’s $814 billion
stimulus package and unchecked entitlement spending over the past two years pushed the
total debt past $14 trillion.”).
72
See Michael A. Livingston, Reinventing Tax Scholarship: Lawyers, Economists, and
the Role of the Legal Academy, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 365, 374 (1998) (“The principal themes
of tax scholarship – fairness, efficiency, and the search for a comprehensive tax base – are
essentially economic in nature, so that even “traditional” tax scholarship has something of a
law-and-economics flavor.”).
71

Anderson Formatted.docx (Do Not Delete)12/12/2011 3:33 PM

2011

THE INJUSTICE OF MoFoDRA

23

simple, it must also be ‘fair.’ At a minimum, it must be perceived as
fair by the taxpaying public in order to withstand the public’s
scrutiny . . . Fairness is indispensable to enacting tax legislation
because it increases taxpayer morale and enhances voluntary
73
compliance.

The only moral compass guiding the exemption of discharged
mortgage debt from taxation is the self-interest of the ranks of those
who engage in or benefit from residential real estate speculation,
including real estate brokers and agents, mortgage lenders, and
speculators. “Income tax law is utilized to encourage or reward
74
activities considered to be beneficial from society’s perspective . . . .”
Those who lost homes and were taxed on forgiven debt prior to 2007
simply did not fail in large enough numbers or lobby strong enough to
receive this tax preference. What does this say about Congress and the
current tax preference in MoFoDRA? “[G]reed drives the . . . powerful
75
to do everything they can to avoid paying their fair share of taxes.”
Residential real estate tax legislation is clearly influenced by the
76
powerful real estate lobby.
At its core, MoFoDRA creates an incentive for people to
strategically walk away from homes that they speculated upon by
77
providing tax-free treatment for the forgiven loan debt. One impact of
this incentive is to further drive down home prices by increasing the
78
supply of homes on the market. Although members of Congress may
argue that MoFoDRA was intended to aid the residential housing
market, I posit that it has the opposite effect, leading to increased
79
defaults on mortgages. MoFoDRA also drives down home values,
creating a long-term punishment and disincentive for those who pay
73

Martinez, supra note 50, at 414-16.
Barker, supra note 40, at 31.
75
Hamill Virginia, supra note 53, at 763.
76
See supra note 32.
77
White, supra note 26, at 985 (“The most significant financial risk from a foreclosure
is the risk of . . . tax liability for the unsatisfied portion of one’s loan upon foreclosure. But
even these potential costs are significantly less than one might expect . . . . tax regulations
have recently changed to waive taxes on the unpaid portion of a mortgage upon foreclosure,
which was previously classified as income to the borrower if the lender reported it as such.”)
78
See supra note 11. See generally Tim Iglesias, Our Pluralist Housing Ethics and the
Struggle for Affordability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511, 520-530 (2007) (discussing the
various housing ethics which have shaped U.S. housing law and policy, including housing
as an economic good, housing as a home, and housing as providing social order).
79
See supra note 77.
74
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their mortgage obligations, by leaving such persons with lower home
80
values.
“It is no great insight to observe that a tax system can serve several
different functions. Most obviously, taxes raise revenue for government
81
services.” In an era of escalating government debt caused by bailouts
and so-called ‘stimulus’ spending, it seems odd that the federal
government would elect to reduce its ability to collect taxes by granting
a tax-free exemption for income derived from discharged residential
82
mortgage debt. “The IRS estimates that as many as 169,000 returns
included a form 982 excluding as much as $24.6 billion in cancelled
83
debt on 2008 tax returns.”
MoFoDRA violates the delicate yin and yang balance of tax policy
for a loan and its repayment. When a lender loans money to a borrower,
the borrower receives the benefit of the proceeds but is not subject to
84
taxation on the loan proceeds due to the repayment obligation. When
the borrower repays the loan, the loan proceeds return to the lender,
85
along with taxable income in the form of the interest paid on the loan.
The non-taxation of the borrower, due to repayment, and taxation of the
86
lender for interest provides a natural balance. When a loan is not
80

See supra note 11.
Galle, supra note 51, at 1346 (“The structure of a tax system can also serve a
regulatory function, as with the classic Pigouvian tactic of imposing a tax on activities that
give rise to externalities.”); Id.
82
See supra note 4.
83
KREIDER & BROSI, supra note 7, at 3-39.
84
Allen Holzer, Restructuring the Tax Treatment for Home Equity Draws:
Implementing Consumption Tax Fundamentals to Preserve Home Equity, 24 BYU J. PUB. L.
225, 232-233 (2010) (“Currently, a mortgagor (a borrower who takes out a home loan) is
not taxed on proceeds received from a loan. This policy is rooted in the Internal Revenue
Code’s (“the Code’s”) presumption that a borrower will pay her loan back in full. Therefore,
the borrower will not receive a net economic gain. . . . In theory, if a borrower pays her loan
back in full, this tax treatment is logical because she truly does not have a net economic
gain. However, if the borrower defaults on the loan, she benefits from tax-free gains
extracted from her property.”) See also Comm’r v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 493
U.S. 203, 207-08 (1990) (explaining that a loan is not income due to the repayment
obligation); Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 307 (1983); James v. United States, 366 U.S.
213, 219 (1961).
85
26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(4) (2010).
86
McMahon & Simmons, supra note 1, at 416. (“Every loan charge-off and mortgage
foreclosure has tax consequences. While the creditor most often claims a bad-debt deduction
or business-related loss, the debtor generally must recognize gross income and pay income
taxes on an amount roughly equal to the creditor’s loss, unless a special exception applies to
exclude the debt relief from income.”).
81
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repaid, the lender engaged in the business of making loans reduces his
or her taxes by taking a deduction for a bad debt, which is offset by the
87
borrower being taxed on the unpaid loan proceeds. This natural tax
policy balance is tainted by MoFoDRA, which exempts the borrower
from taxation on the discharged debt while granting the lender (e.g.,
banks which received bailout money) a tax deduction for the unpaid
88
loan. Instead of creating a level playing field of asset parity,
Congress’s exclusion of income from discharged mortgage debt is
merely putting more fuel on the fire for residential real estate
speculation.
D. Even Without MoFoDRA, There Was Already Relief for Those
Who Were Insolvent.
MoFoDRA was never needed to protect those who are truly
underwater. Section 108(a)(1)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code
excludes discharge of indebtedness from income if the taxpayer is
89
“insolvent.” Insolvency is defined in Section 108(d)(3) as “the excess
90
of liabilities over the fair market value of assets.” Judicial
interpretation of this provision “requires that all of the taxpayer’s assets,
including assets exempt from the claims of creditors under state law, be
included in determining whether the taxpayer’s liabilities exceed his
91
assets.”
For those who argue that MoFoDRA was necessary to prevent
harming those who are upside down in their mortgage, the insolvency
exception already offered protection. MoFoDRA extends tax-free
treatment to individuals who are solvent and have the capacity to pay
income tax on discharged mortgage debt. The insolvency exception
obviates the need for MoFoDRA. Similarly, if MoFoDRA’s income tax
exclusion rests upon the elusive concern of anticipatory filings for
bankruptcy, then perhaps all forgiven loan debt, mortgage or otherwise,
should be excluded from taxation for the fear that the recipients of this
87

26 U.S.C. § 166 (2010).
Id.
89
26 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1)(B) (2010). See also Leila E. Dal Pos, Hard Times for
Individuals: Creditor Issues & Estate Administration, 50 N.H.B.J. 16, 19 (2009) (“[T]he
term ‘insolvent’ means the excess of liabilities over the fair market value of assets,
determined immediately before the discharge. The amount that may be excluded from
income is no more than the amount by which the taxpayer is insolvent.”).
90
26 U.S.C. § 108(d)(3) (2010).
91
McMahon & Simmons, supra note 1, at 455.
88
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income might declare bankruptcy. Barking at shadows does not justify
poor tax policy.
If banks and mortgage brokers are the evil causa sine quo non of
mortgage debt being incurred in the first place, and individuals who
speculated in residential real estate did so under the duress of nasty
banks and mortgage brokers, then the victim should pursue civil
92
remedies against the transgressors for all damages. Civil remedies are
93
also appropriate in the event of fraudulent foreclosure mills.
MoFoDRA cannot be justified by using a broad brush to paint a picture
of borrowers being unfairly influenced by real estate agents, banks, and
mortgage brokers.
It could be argued that a person who walks away from his or her
home is already punished by loss of any down payment and principal
amount paid, or by virtue of a bad credit score. The loss of the down
payment and any principal payments made are part of home ownership,
and in any event, would reduce the total amount of discharged debt and
taxable income, even without MoFoDRA. As to the issue of credit
scores, “While the actual financial cost of having a poor credit score for
a few years may be hard to quantify, it is not likely to be significant for
most individuals - especially not when compared to the savings
achieved by walking away from a seriously underwater mortgage.
Whereas a good credit score might save an average person tens of
thousands of dollars over the course of a lifetime, a few years of poor
94
credit shouldn’t cost more than few thousand dollars. “
Professor Brent White of the University of Arizona has published
an intriguing article about the strategic decision on whether to walk
95
away from an underwater mortgage. His article is well reasoned and
even handed in its legal, moral, and ethical analysis of the topic. My
92

White, supra note 26, at 993, note 100.
See generally Todd Ruger, Shortcuts On The Paper Trail, SARASOTA HERALD
TRIBUNE, Nov. 28, 2010, at A1 (improper dates and signatures on mortgage documents have
resulted in inappropriate foreclosures); Tom Harvey, B of A Focus of Utah Foreclosure
Lawsuit, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Feb. 17, 2011 (no page number listed) (challenges raised
to foreclosure process); Julie Creswell & Barry Meier, Bet on Foreclosure Boom Turns Sour
For Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2011, § B, at 1 (investors in a business specializing in
foreclosures are concerned over possible inappropriate activity in the foreclosure process);
John Schwartz, Judges Berate Bank Lawyers in Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2011, §
A, at 1 (failure to follow appropriate technicalities in foreclosure process raise judicial
concerns).
94
White, supra note 26, at 984-85.
95
Id.
93
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thesis in this article does not conflict with Professor White’s analysis, as
I merely offer up that part of the strategic analysis on whether to walk
away from a mortgage must include the calculation of taxes due on the
discharged debt for a solvent individual, because discharged mortgage
loan debt is a form of income, but for the existence of MoFoDRA.
VI. UNFORGIVEN; THE SOLUTION TO INCOME FROM
DISCHARGED MORTGAGE DEBT
My first two proffered solutions to the forgiveness of mortgage
debt conundrum primarily address consistency in application. If taxing
discharged loan debt is a good thing, then it must always be a good
thing and always done. If taxing discharged loan debt is a bad thing,
then it must never be done and reparations must be paid to those who
were wronged.
A. The New Law is Good; Pay Reparations for the Past
If MoFoDRA’s tax exemption for unpaid mortgage debt is such a
great idea, then it should be extended perpetually and not terminate at
96
the end of 2012. In such an event, reparations must be paid to all
persons who have paid income tax in the past on discharged mortgage
indebtedness. Such reparations obviously must include the principal
amount paid in taxes plus interest and any penalties paid thereupon.
Indeed, other commentators have examined the topic of potential
retroactive application of MoFoDRA:
“While retroactively applying the Act’s provisions to years prior to
2007 would necessitate some burden on the IRS in refunding paid taxes,
it is not clear why the usually applicable rules for amendment should
not provide an administratively feasible retroactive start date. Apart
from procedural considerations, there is little plausible substantive
rationale for the start date, as the mortgage crisis was well underway
97
during 2006.”
Additionally, if MoFoDRA is good tax policy, then the theme of
consistency requires that all forgiven debt should not be taxed, whether
96
See supra note 4 (MoFoDRA, as enacted and codified, took effect with the 2007 tax
year, and by virtue of the text of the statute, terminates if the debt is discharged before
January 1, 2013, i.e. by the conclusion of the tax year 2012); see also Hamill Virginia, supra
note 53, at note 138 (explaining that those who embrace supply side economic theory
believe that cutting taxes will spur economic growth).
97
See Carlton, supra note 21, at 612.
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for credit cards, auto loans, gambling, or otherwise. No other type of
forgiven debt should have to serve as the unappealing (i.e. taxed) stepbrother or step-sister of the favorite child, residential real estate.
B. The New Law is Bad; Tax Discharged Mortgage Debt
Another consistent and equal solution is to determine that forgiven
mortgage loan debt actually is income and it must be taxed. This would
require Congress to immediately revoke the current tax exemption
under MoFoDRA and commence taxing the discharged debt.
Opponents of this solution might argue that this could accelerate
foreclosures, as individuals may seek to strategically walk away from
loans before discharged debt becomes taxed once again. That is a
possibility, but only one part of the equation on whether to walk away
98
from a home. Taxing the forgiven debt will only affect solvent
individuals who walk away from homes. Those who are insolvent and
receive income in the form of cancelled mortgage debt will continue to
99
be protected by the insolvency provision in the Internal Revenue Code.
What about those solvent individuals who have already profited by
not being taxed upon forgiven loan debt? One way to address this
100
problem would be to retroactively tax those who walked away. The
difficulty in doing so is that retroactive taxation runs counter to the
tenets of fairness described earlier. Despite this, it is tempting to collect
income tax from solvent individuals who were complicit in the housing
bubble and benefited from untaxed income in the form of forgiven debt.
C. A Pragmatic Approach: Reward Those Who Pay and Stay
A third solution to the problem of MoFoDRA recognizes that
perhaps some form of tax relief is digestible. The Internal Revenue
98

See White, supra note 26.
See supra text accompanying notes 14, 89-91.
100
See generally Saul Levmore, The Case For Retroactive Taxation, 22 J. LEGAL
STUD. 265 (1993) (analyzing economic, political, and public policy aspects of retroactive
taxation, and establishing that retroactive taxation is a potential workable solution, despite
the general disposition against it); ERIKA K. LUNDER ET AL. CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R40466, RETROACTIVE TAXATION OF EXECUTIVE BONUSES:
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF H.R. 1586 AND S. 651 (2009) (discussing the
constitutionality of retroactive taxation of bonuses). But see Harold M. Somers, Retroactive
Taxation: A Triumph of Law Over Economics, (Univ. of Cal. L.A. Dep’t of Econ., Working
Paper No. 726, 1995) (arguing that changing the rules of taxation after economic decisions
have been made is an abhorrent idea).
99
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Code calls for taxation on any significant modification to a loan, such as
101
the interest rate or timing of payments, and not only discharged
principal. MoFoDRA could be modified to only exempt taxation for
individuals who receive a reduced interest rate, a “no interest rate” time
period or tolling of interest accumulation, or extended payment terms.
This approach would not allow discharge of any principal amount to be
exempt from taxation. This significant loan modification exemption
should only apply if the individual continues to pay the full principal
amount of the loan. This resolution is a far cry superior to MoFoDRA’s
current allowance of tax-free income in the form of discharged principal
debt.
Some might take this pragmatic solution a step further and support
forgiveness of taxation on a small principal amount, something
substantially less than the regressive $2 million exemption under
102
MoFoDRA, as long as the borrower continues to fully pay the
remainder of the loan. Arguably, this approach could create an incentive
for an individual to remain in his or her home and continue performing
his or her payment obligations, albeit at a reduced principal amount. If
the income forgiveness is significantly reduced below the current $2
million potential exemption, and tied to an individual’s adjusted gross
income in order to better protect low and middle income individuals,
such a solution could address the vertical equity issues described earlier,
but would still continue to fail to address the horizontal equity issue of
those who were burdened with taxation prior to MoFoDRA. From a
perspective of true equality, implementation of any part of this
pragmatic solution would require application to all types of debt, and
not just residential real estate.
V. CONCLUSION
The sacred cow of residential real estate tax preferences needs to
be slaughtered, or at least forced to eat in the same pasture as all other
capital investments. Congress created tax-free residential real estate
profits through tax code revisions in 1997 which fueled speculation in
housing. When the music stopped, Congress granted preferential tax
treatment to persons who defaulted on their mortgage debt, instead of
rewarding those who honor their mortgage obligations.
101
102

See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
See supra note 6.
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Given the fact that the Internal Revenue Code already shields
against taxation on forgiven mortgage debt for those who are insolvent,
MoFoDRA was entirely unnecessary. Instead of protecting the
downtrodden, MoFoDRA grants a regressive preference to solvent and
wealthy individuals who strategically evade taxation on forgiven
residential mortgage debt. The cost of this legislation results in reduced
governmental coffers and tighter mortgage lending practices, squeezing
innocent newcomers from being able to purchase a home and actually
pay the loan.
Tax policy should not result in disparate treatment. Tax legislation
needs to have a coherent theme, commencing with standards of
consistency and equality. MoFoDRA ultimately punishes individuals
who perform their mortgage payment obligations, and rewards solvent
persons who speculated and strategically default on residential real
estate loans.

